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Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language

Autor Stephen Finlay

Editorial OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language
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  • Editorial OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
  • ISBN13 9780190649630
  • ISBN10 0190649631
  • Tipus Llibre
  • Pàgines 288
  • Col.lecció Oxford Moral Theory #
  • Any Edició 2016
  • Idioma Anglès
  • Encuadernació Paperback

Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language

Autor Stephen Finlay

Editorial OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

32,00€
No disponible, consulti disponibilitat
Enviament gratuït
Espanya peninsular
Enviament GRATUÏT a partir de 19€

a Espanya peninsular

Enviaments en 24/48h

-5% de descompte en tots els llibres

Recollida GRATUÏTA a llibreria

Vine i deixa't sorprendre!

Detalls del llibre

This is one of the richest, most sophisticated, and most impressive books on metaethics to have been published in my lifetime. Everyone with any interest in normative language ought to read it. Those who would seek to defend reductive naturalist views of the sort Finlay develops here will find it a treasure trove of dialectical resources that they will want to plunder repeatedly. Those who seek to attack such views or to defend rival views will find it a challenge it would be shameful to ignore. (James Lenman, LANGUAGE)

Stephen Finlay has made an indispensable contribution to our understanding of normative, evaluative, and moral language...his broadly relativist approach offers an intellectually appealing alternative (The Philosophers' Magazine)

This is a book that anyone with an interest in metaethics ought to read, and I recommend it very highly. (Analysis)

Stephen Finlay's Confusion of Tongues (COT) is an ambitious book. Its first half advances a unifying semantics for normative words, including 'good', 'ought', and 'reason'. In the second half, he argues that this semantics, combined with a single pragmatic principle, can explain the uses of such expressions of special interest to ethicists. COT's engagement with these topics is rich and complex. (Mind)