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Rationality in action

Autor John R. Searle

Editorial THE MIT PRESS

Rationality in action
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  • Editorial THE MIT PRESS
  • ISBN13 9780262194631
  • ISBN10 0262194635
  • Tipus LLIBRE
  • Pàgines 303
  • Any Edició 2001
  • Idioma Anglès
  • Encuadernació Tela

Rationality in action

Autor John R. Searle

Editorial THE MIT PRESS

-5% dte.    68,61€
65,18€
Estalvia 3,43€
No disponible, consulti disponibilitat
Enviament gratuït
Espanya peninsular
Enviament GRATUÏT a partir de 19€

a Espanya peninsular

Enviaments en 24/48h

-5% de descompte en tots els llibres

Recollida GRATUÏTA a llibreria

Vine i deixa't sorprendre!

Detalls del llibre

In this invigorating book, John Searle defines the six major claims of what he calls the Classical Model of rationality and shows why they are false. He then presents an alternative theory of the role of rationality in thought and action.

A central point of Searle's theory is that it is only irrational actions that tend to be directly caused by beliefs and desires -- for example, the actions of a person in the grip of an obsession or addiction. In most cases of rational action, there is a gap between the motivating desire and the actual decision making. The traditional name for this gap is "freedom of the will." According to Searle, all rational activity presupposes free will. For rationality is possible only where one has a choice among various rational as well as irrational options.

Unlike many philosophical tracts. Rationality in Action invites the reader to apply the author's ideas to everyday life. Searle shows, for example, that contrary to the traditional philosophical view, weakness of will is very common. He also argues that rationality is often about choosing between conflicting reasons for action. Extending his theory of rationality to the self. Searle shows how rational deliberation presupposes an irreducible notion of the self.