First published in 1961, Perception and the Physical World contends that there are insuperable difficulties for the Representative and Phenomenalist theories. Unreflective common sense thinks of sense-perception as a direct grasping of the nature of the physical world. But when we are confronted with facts about sensory illusion, about the physical and physiological causes of perception, and with modern scientific views of the real nature of matter, it is hard to maintain such a 'Direct Realist' theory of perception. We tend to substitute a Copy or Representative theory which puts sense-impressions between ourselves and physical reality. Some philosophers overwhelmed by the difficulties of the Copy theory, retreat into Phenomenalism, which identifies the physical world with our sense-impressions. The author re-examines all the traditional objections to a Direct Realist theory and tries to show that they can be overcome. This book will be of interest to students of philosophy.