Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Series Preface -- Introduction -- PART I THEORY -- The Role of Liability -- 1 Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral -- 2 Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety -- 3 A Comparison of Taxes, Regulation, and Liability Rules under Imperfect Information -- 4 A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation -- The Incentive Effects of Liability -- 5 Strict Liability versus Negligence -- 6 Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting -- 7 When Does the Rule of Liability Matter? -- 8 Strict Liability in a Principal-Agent Model -- 9 On Liability and Insurance -- 10 The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence under Strict Liability and under Negligence -- 11 Bankruptcy and Care Choice -- 12 Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries -- PART II APPLICATIONS -- Conceptual Models -- 13 The Effects of Environmental Liability on Industrial Real Estate Development -- 14 Lender Penalty for Environmental Damage and the Equilibrium Cost of Capital -- 15 Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors -- 16 Indivisible Toxic Torts: The Economics of Joint and Several Liability -- 17 Liability for Groundwater Contamination from Pesticides -- 18 The Structure of Penalties in Environmental Enforcement: An Economic Analysis -- Empirical Models -- 19 Controlling Stochastic Pollution Events Through Liability Rules: Some Evidence from OCS Leasing -- 20 Risk Premiums for Environmental Liability: Does Superfund Increase the Cost of Capital? -- 21 Strict Liability as a Deterrent in Toxic Waste Management: Empirical Evidence from Accident and Spill Data -- 22 Liability and Large-Scale, Long-Term Hazards -- Liability Reform -- 23 Environmental Liability Reform and Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe